Sempre alle prese con letture di vario genere per la mia tesi, oggi pomeriggio ho sfogliato il testo originale di Computing Machinery and Intelligence, uno dei masterpiece di Alan Turing pubblicato nel 1950 ed apripista del cosiddetto “Turing test”. L’articolo e’ strutturato in maniera abbastanza particolare, con una parte iniziale dove viene introdotto il celebre “imitation game” che poi diventera’ appunto il test di Turing, seguito da lunghe pagine dove il matematico inglese risponde in anticipo a quelle che sono le critiche piu’ comuni che pensa il suo lavoro ricevera’. Tra queste non manca una riflessione sulla “Theological Objection”. Scritta in maniera semplice, elegante ed in maniera tale da lasciare poco, se non nessuno, spazio a repliche di qualsivoglia natura.

Thinking is a function of man’s immortal soul. God has given us an immortal soul to every man and woman, but not to any other animal or to machines. Hence no animal or machine can think.
I am unable to accept any part of this, but will attempt to reply in theological terms. I should find the argument more convincing if animals were classed with men, for there is a greater difference, to my mind, between the typical animate and the inanimate than there is between man and the other animals. The arbitrary character of the orthodox view becomes clearer if we consider how it might appear to a member of some other religious community. How do Christians regard the Moslem view that women have no souls? But let us leave this point aside and return to the main argument. It appears to me that the argument quoted above implies a serious restriction of the omnipotence of the Almighty. It is admitted that there are certain things that He cannot do such as confer a soul on an elephant if He sees fit? We might expect that He would only exercise this power in conjunction with a mutation which provided the elephant with an appropriately improved brain to minister to the needs of this sort. An argument of exactly similar form may be made for the case of machines. It may seem different because it is more difficult to “swallow.” But this really only means that we think it would be less likely that He would consider the circumstances suitable for conferring a soul. The circumstances in question are discussed in the rest of this paper. In attempting to construct such machines we should not be irreverently usurping His power of creating souls, any more than we are in the procreation of children: rathere we are, in either case, instruments of His will providing mansions for the souls that He creates.
However, this is mere speculation. I am not very impressed with theological arguments whatever they may be used to support. Such arguments have often been found unsatisfactory in the past. In the time of Galileo it was argued that the texts, “And the sun stood still … and hasted not to go down about a whole day” (Joshua x. 13) and “He laid the foundations of the earth, that it should not move at any time” (Psalm cv. 5) were an adequate refutation of the Copernican theory. With our present knowledge such an argument appears futile. When that knowledge was not available it made a quite different impression.